makeshift retractable jetties that can be put into and taken out of the water. These men, like a lot of working-class rural Cubans, fish to augment their own larders or earn enough to purchase other items on the grey market. The question of legality simply is not a factor in their lives. Illegality is often required in 1990s Cuba if you are to survive no matter who you are. Government official, elite athlete, academic, car owner, restaurant manager, shopkeeper -it does not matter because everyone has to find alternative sources of income outside their state-sanctioned jobs because state salaries no longer meet an individual's basic needs.
In many ways these conditions are emblematic of ethnography itself. The ambiguities of assigning a "role" to these men, the (il)legality of being at sea, and the (un)certainties of life demonstrate a crucial aspect of ethnographic inquiry. Ethnography addresses what we don't know as part of our knowledge production. We may have some idea of what we are looking for in the first place -that is why we go to "the field" after all. But that presumed knowledge is transformed if ethnography is being done well. I had no intention of being in a boat off the north coast of Cuba when planning my fieldwork. The vagaries of fieldwork and the shifting circumstances while I pursued the ethnographic object "Cuban baseball" led me to a makeshift jetty on a relatively calm, cool, overcast winter's night. In acknowledging and addressing the incomplete nature of human knowledge and our very lives, ethnographic research draws out the dialogic choppiness of our knowledge about the world. It tacks between our certainties about our selves and worlds and the uncertainties that surround and penetrate those certitudes. Much, much more than a sympathetic description and subjective analysis of a "culture," at its best, ethnography is an attempt to discern at least part of the lifeworld of a specific group of people and how they live in those worlds. Ethnography is a deeply powerful empirical form of knowledge production precisely because of the ethnographer's entanglement with the object of enquiry (Chung, 2009; Peterson, 2009) .
On Ethnographic Knowledge
It is now a well-worn cliché that knowledge, even that of material things, is socially constructed, mediated and, at best, secondhand. Outside of our narrow specialties, we are all in a position of knowing only what we read (or watch on the internet). Naturally, it would be farcical to put too much stock in those forms of knowledge on their own. Many taken-forgranted concepts are simply ethereal and happen at such incomprehensible scales that they cannot be experienced directly and we therefore mistake their assumption for knowledge. The assertion of ostensibly perfect information produces, more often than not, imperfect, superficial knowledges that have to be discussed as abstractions taken on a necessary degree of faith. Such abstract knowledge is, of course, real and collectively imagined, but because of its very nature, it is extremely difficult to know it as such. Governments, the media and the academy, for related but different reasons, all tend to employ such abstractions as if their meanings were more or less self-evident. This creates a faux-empiricism and an illusory sense of concreteness. We are all too often unaware of the significance of things because our conceptual language simply does not articulate questions that enable us to fathom just what is actually going on. The ability to tease out problematizing questions regarding what we know, as well as the requisite knowledge needed to answer those questions, is the real strength of ethnography.
The recent devaluation of ethnography as a viable form of knowledge production stems from an ascendant neoliberal ideological position that emphasizes an ability to plan and control reality via science-as-technology. Ethnography's devaluation by think tanks, industry insiders, and policy makers is underpinned by a technical "politics of understanding" that inveigles predictions and pronouncements that never require actual use of knowledge (Luhmann, 1998, p. 69-70) . Instead, the function of "experts" in this environment is to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   6 establish points of discourse and discussion surrounding established "facts" that must be managed by reducing various forms of knowledge to a single quantifiable standard (Merry 2016, p. 27-43) . The emphasis on the management of knowledge through a quantifiable process means that ethnography, allegedly, has no practical outcome or "impact" -a grave concern given national funding bodies' recent emphasis on "impact." They fetishize "facts" as discoverable entities existing outside human reality waiting to be found on a seashore rather than engaging with the undulating and oscillating lived human realities from which facts form. Under this authoritarian regime of "expertise," ethnography appears to be irrelevant -transformed from an assertion to an anecdote, or even a mere asterisk, that obliquely supports already known "facts." The neoliberal transformation of universities has reinforced this mutation of ethnography. Even within the discipline, some anthropologists engage in theorizing and philosophizing over "facts" rather than using their field-based experiences to produce their own anthropological knowledge.
Ethnography, however, begins from the position that one is not "authorized" or "expert" within the worlds of the people with whom the ethnographer works. Just because I had "expert" baseball knowledge and skills did not mean that I had the requisite knowledge of baseball as it exists in Cubans' world. My knowledge of baseball reconstituted as I experienced Cuban diamonds and stadia. I had to learn the Cuban way of baseball and through that process, gain an incomplete understanding of what it means to be Cuban (Carter 2008, pp. 159-182) . My knowledge garnered from my fieldwork in the 1990s mutated with subsequent fieldwork in the 2000s and in the 2010s precisely because Cubans' epistemological worlds were changing as well. My insistence on long-term study forces me to acknowledge the situatedness of my work. My knowledge as a former player, a white man, and an American citizen all influenced my interactions with everyone there. My position in Cuba was ambiguous since most of the people with whom I worked knew only two kinds of knowledge of Cuba must evolve as well. Not everything I learned in the 1990s is still accurate or even real today. The best ballplayers no longer play in Cuba; they play in the US despite the near-impossibility of legally migrating directly there from Cuba. Our knowledge is situated in specific moments in time and space from specific positions in the field --baseball and ethnographic (Carter, 2011a) . This is how ethnography works. Ethnographic knowledge reconstitutes itself over time. It floats lightly across the surface of people's worlds while probing humanity's depths and, in so doing, offers, not just a different perspective but a more fluid mode of knowing the world. By its very nature, ethnography challenges forms of "expertise" precisely because "expert knowledges" close down questioning and erase other possibilities. Ethnographic inquiry repeatedly demonstrates that the "facts" or "data" are not waiting to be discovered and recorded. They are fictions in the sense that that knowledge is "something made" or " 'fashioned;' not as if they are false, unfactual, or merely 'as if' thought experiments" (Geertz 1973, p. 15-16) . Ethnographies are crafted and the materials used and in what combinationshow they are "made up"-are of vital importance. This does not mean that ethnographic data is not empirical. If anything, the open questioning of the "facts" and their active construction by the researcher is an important aspect of any study. Anthropologists have long insisted that the very "object" of knowledge changes depending on which and whether a statistical relation or a social system of relations is privileged (Westbrook, 2008, p. 103) . Similarly, the disciplinary training of the ethnographer affects the kind of ethnography produced. This is hardly surprising given that each discipline approaches the ethnographic subject from different ontological perspectives.
To illustrate, consider three widely acclaimed ethnographies on the marginalized, urban poor conducted in Philadelphia (Goffman, 2014) , Chicago (Venkatesh, 2008) , and in New York (Bourgois, 1996) . Each ethnographer's ethnicity, gender, discipline, and nationality differs from the other two, yet all three (re)produce the same tropes despite their ethnographies' geographic and temporal differences. Nonetheless, the disciplinary ontology produces subtly different kinds of ethnographic knowledge. The sociologists, Goffman and Venkatesh, focus more on the determinant social structures of family, police, community, and gang shaping their interlocutors' lives. Police and law enforcement encounters fuels Goffman's classificatory account of "clean" and "dirty" lives, therein reinforcing her collaborators' inability to transcend the forces shaping their lives. Venkatesh recounts how gang-life and organizational structure mirrors the corporate world, even taking on the role of "CEO" by becoming a gang leader for one day. The two inadvertently reify the structural conditions of their marginalized subjects rather than demonstrate how residents' build their own lives and situated knowledges as Bourgois does in his ethnography on how the dealers and users of East Harlem make their lives and worlds in spite of, rather than because of, the oppressive institutionalized domination that marginalizes these urban populations: For Bourgois, the police are there offstage whereas they are active characters in Goffman and Ventakesh's ethnographies. These three ethnographies make it abundantly apparent that ethnography captures the contradictions found in the vagaries of impersonal power that shapes individuals' everyday lives. They all challenge the dominant neoliberal political orthodoxy about individual selfresponsibility within a "free market" through their implicit comparison of "white middleclass Americans" whose lives in the formal economy are as different from these marginalized Americans as the lives of Trobriand islanders are to European ethnographers. "No good ethnography is self-contained. Implicitly or explicitly ethnography is an act of comparison" (Sahlins, 1993, p.10) . Ethnography is inherently comparative but the kinds of comparison an ethnography makes depends on one's disciplinary training.
All social science disciplinary forms of knowledge include what human beings do as part of their endeavors but only anthropology places homo sapiens as its explicit object of enquiry and its principal emphasis on the myriad ways we become human beings.
Ethnographies on the same subject will differ depending on the ontological base of the study.
This broader, more holistic approach distinguishes anthropological ethnography from other forms of ethnography even as the relationship between ethnography and anthropology has become increasingly problematic. The assertion that "ethnography is anthropology or it is nothing" (Sahlins, 1993, p. 10 ) no longer holds water. But "if ethnography is not a means to an end in anthropology, then neither is anthropology the servant of ethnography" (Ingold, 2008, p. 88 ). For ethnography is recursive: ethnography's contents change through the contexts in which that research is conducted. Our misapprehensions and misunderstandings inform our investigative tools and disciplinary compass so we can generate the possibility of new concepts by bringing previously unrelated ones into relationships that mutually modify the meanings of the concepts involved (Holbraad, 2012, pp. 252-3) .
That ethnography and anthropology are not symbiotically beholden to one another is hardly a surprise to anyone outside anthropology. Ethnography today is just as likely to be claimed as a practice in art and design studios, by education professionals, or by health practitioners as it is by anthropologists. However ethnography is practiced, that practice is a craft and to be a craftsperson represents the condition of being engaged (Sennet, 2009, p. 20) .
Like all crafts, ethnography requires long, skillful practice, and all skills begin, if not continue, as bodily practices. It is through these bodily practices in the field that the technical understanding of ethnography develops. While individual skills (i.e. methods) can be taught and trained, it is through their combined implementation in a specific context-laden field that ethnographic craft begins to germinate. Ethnography is not a rote-training program of steps or sequential skills developed but a honing of field-based investigative skills practiced on a regular basis in specific contexts. These skills, of course, can be learned by anyone. The craft of ethnography, however, depends on the nature of fieldwork and the disciplinary framing of one's epistemological practices. These differences are what lead to distinct notions of ethnographic research and writing: i.e., ethnographic sensibilities.
Ethnographic Sensibilities
One reason why the relationship between anthropology and ethnography has become strained in recent decades is that what is meant by fieldwork has undergone major transformations. From anthropology's very beginnings, the constitution of fieldwork was a central question (Barth et al, 2005; Stocking, 1981) . The Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski invented what now is recognized as the basic tenets and practices of ethnography, insisting that one must get off the verandah, live amongst the people being studied, interact with them in their own language, and concentrate on the everyday minutiae of their lives (1961[1922] , pp. 2-25). This logic privileges direct observation conducted in a remote site, a notion thatalong with the colonially veiled constitution of civilized and savage-constructs the archetypical fieldworker as a Euro-American, white, middle-class man. Fieldwork thus became synonymous with a heroic quest into Others' territory, a trope that engendered and cemented Malinowski's mythopoetic charter of modern ethnography (Stocking, 1992; cf. Clifford, 1988) .
Ethnography, of course, changed throughout the twentieth century as paradigmatic shifts occurred throughout the social sciences, including anthropology. These shifts occurred because of the global shifts in power and our interlocutors' growing resistance to the traditional forms of fieldwork. Ethnographers can no longer assume that they are free to enter (and leave) people's lives as they please. Of course, this shift occurred not only because of anthropology's self-critique, but because the people with whom we work have been pushing back now for decades. Nor is ethnography tied to a singular geographic location. With the advent of multi-sited ethnography associated with the analysis of global flows, of digital ethnography and of the ethnography of online social media, "being in the field" is no longer a sense of embodied co-presence but a recognition that spatial proximity is not a requirement for meaningful human relationships. How humans relate to their surroundings and build their relationships are a central part of their worlds. Recent, powerfully evocative anthropological ethnographies detail these relations that exist without shared physical spaces, or even material bodies (Boellstorff, 2008; Coleman, 2015) for that matter, making it apparent that the relations that make any one of us human may not be comprised of intensive face-to-face interactions bounded within a singular unit but an unbounded kaleidoscopic mosaic of relationships that forms a Self.
During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the unit of analysis in anthropology was a "culture" that existed as a discrete, whole universe. In the past few decades, however, anthropological sensibilities evolved considerably from the study of "a culture" to a form of cultural critique (Marcus and Fischer, 1986) , of engagement or encounter (Marcus, 1998), or of design (Rabinow et al, 2008) . Anthropologists debated whether the concept of culture was even useful (Fox and King, 2002; Ortner, 1999) . In the twenty-first century, anthropologists have taken the concept of culture in new directions.
Recent ethnographies conceptualize culture through imaginaries (García Canclini, 2014), intersubjectivities (Kohn, 2013) assemblages (Ong and Collier, 2004) , and as emergence (Tsing, 2015) . Additionally, some ethnographically-based metaphysical introspection on culture has challenged the previously taken-for-granted division between nature and culture leading to a wide ranging debate as to how to conceptualize culture when it becomes the constant and nature is relativistic (Viveiros de Castro, 2015; cf. Piña-Cabral, 2015) even as others debated whether culture is the equivalent of ontology (Carrithers et al. 2008) . While these debates remain unresolved, ironically, culture is no longer the unquestioned ontological object of the discipline even as it became an increasingly important object in other disciplines. Thus, anthropology's continuing uncertainties surrounding its central ontological object of enquiry also leads to methodological quandaries. These disciplinary selfflagellations continue as anthropology evolves and central to these disciplinary worries is the nature of ethnography and how it shapes the production of anthropological knowledge.
Amongst these worries about ethnography's (per)mutations are the changing conceptions of fields and conducting fieldwork. It has long been customary to divide ethnography into three distinct practices: that of observation, description, and comparison.
These operations, however, are not discrete stages but intertwined activities that are not readily separable. One cannot say easily where, when or how one ends and the other begins.
Furthermore, in anthropology, these distinctions were based on spatial distinctions -"going to", "being in", and "returning from" the field -that shaped field practices, making ethnography akin to that mythopoetic quest identified earlier. But a spatial circumscription of the field is no longer tenable. This spatial determinism was dismantled in anthropology twenty years ago (Amit, 2000; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997) . The rise of globalization, transnationalism, and other macroscale processes linking discontiguous localities forced a reconsideration of anthropology's core practices. Now, it is best if the field is conceptualized as a confluence of various forces enmeshing the ethnographic object of enquiry (Carter, 2011a; Marcus. 1998) . My presence in that boat was my early recognition that the spatial solidity of Cuba was my own misapprehension of the field. Cuba floats on currents that alter its composition (Carter 2008, p. 36 ). It does not end where land meets sea. That sea excursion captured a small sense of what trafficked athletes felt as they try to leave the country clandestinely (Carter 2011b, p. 152-179) . By going to sea for a few hours in this manner, my own tense nervousness, heightened precariousness, and acute vulnerability transformed my understandings about Cuban baseball, Cubans, Cuba, and how to do ethnography.
An alternative approach shifts the focus onto fieldwork's temporalities despite endemic temporal distancing in early anthropological ethnography (Fabian, 1983) . Time remains a challenge in terms of fieldwork. "The ethical profile of the good anthropologist yields no methodological a priori concerning the appropriate duration of a project. Everything hinges on the terms and conditions of the question of research itself" (Faubion 2009, p. 163) .
The critical practice of anthropological fieldwork is typically long, often meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated. It demands a critical social awareness that multiple, different temporalities might be at play simultaneously (Malkki 2007, p. 177 ). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The simple realization that a good fieldworker is not ipso facto a good ethnographer raises a second aspect of anthropological unease with ethnography's travels. Ethnography mutates as it crosses disciplinary boundaries because each discipline has its own a priori ontological object, whether that object is "society" (sociology), "health" (medicine), "space" (geography), "mind" (psychology) or "culture" and "subculture" found in a range of interdisciplinary fields (cultural studies, sport studies, media studies, leisure studies and so forth), underpinning the ethnographer's default position. These different ontological certainties are not, in and of themselves, a problem. However, the move towards ethnography as critique, encounter, or design thins the resonant depths of ethnography as knowledge. The conflation of methods and methodology in particular makes the thinning of ethnography worrisome.
Ethnographic (Per)Mutations
Within anthropology there is no such thing as "ethnographic methods." Ethnography is not a set of formal procedural means designed to satisfy the ends of inquiry. Ethnography has a particular philosophical stance towards phenomena, including taking a particular disposition towards the world and thus asking certain kinds of questions about phenomena, produces its own knowledge, and disseminates that knowledge in specific forms of exposition.
Ethnographers make use of a range of methods: participant observation, interviews, film, audio recordings, printed materials, social media, and more. Thus, ethnography is a methodology -that is, a specific way of doing research and producing knowledge about our world in which the researcher engages with the limits of one's own knowledge. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The question of whether an ethnographer can truly be a good ethnographer if one transgressed certain boundaries was an ongoing concern in twentieth-century anthropology: first as a worry about "going native" and then whether a "native anthropologist" could maintain "objective" or "critical" distance because of one's personal life history. Such concerns over the positionality and voice of "native" ethnographers are misguided and misplaced (Narayan, 1993; Jacobs-Huey, 2002) . By the logic of this solipsistic categorization, I was a native ethnographer of baseball given that I had spent my entire life 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 16 a relatively skilled baseball player. While that set of physical skills and bits of esoteric knowledge of baseball trivia served me well while studying the spectacle of Cuban baseball (Carter, 2008) , the ability to pitch a baseball actually hindered me on the cricket pitch in Northern Ireland where I found the embodied skill of bowling (a different form of throwing than pitching) utterly impossible (Carter, 2003) . These embodied practices require sensory as well as sensorimotor skills: one has to learn how to see, taste, and otherwise sense the world in the way the ethnographer's collaborators do (Pink, 2009; Stoller, 1989 ). Yet there are, to my knowledge, no dedicated training tools to learn to sense the world in a different lifeworld.
The only means I know of is immersion in that lifeworld in which long-term, in-depth interactions are conducted in a way that permits collaboration between ethnographers and their consultants.
The range of tools available to the ethnographer, therefore, cannot be a closed set of procedures. Ethnography's open-endedness is partly why it, especially anthropological ethnography, is so difficult to teach in a standardized manner from a textbook. Generally, anthropologists have avoided attempting to write any such manual. The widely respected manuals used outside anthropology to instruct "how to do ethnography" are barely touched within the discipline because of the anthropological sensibility that ethnography is not a set of standard or universally applicable methods.
Of course, anthropology has its methods, but ethnography is not one of them:
ethnography is a methodology. The idea of an "ethnographic method" is a transdisciplinary mutation invoked when something else is meant entirely. The emergence of this term appears to be a part of the transdisciplinary discussions around "mixed methods" that treat ethnography as one of several means of gathering data, again as if ethnography was reducible to a form of gathering information. In this vein, "ethnographic methods" is often conflated with a combination of participant observation and interviews. Observation, participant There is no middle way.
Conclusion: Ethnographic Currents
To engage well in ethnography is to recognize how a singular phenomenon opens up the deeper one delves into it. There is an unfolding rather an encompassment of the ethnographic object by the world. Ethnography remains central to anthropological practice because it is still the best way to capture the diversity of human life in all its magnificence while also stripping away the deceptions people impose on themselves and others. It allows us to find our ways when we are sailing in the dark. How we choose to engage and deal with our world, the currents of meaning we make out of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 This article mirrors the very incompleteness of ethnography. Ethnography continues to change in its conception and practice. Fieldwork is losing its spatial parameters, the ethnographic object of enquiry can only ever be engaged in a partial manner, and ethnographic knowledge can only ever be incomplete. These conditions are hardly weaknesses of ethnographic knowledge. Ethnography's choppiness -its discomfiting sensations of uncertainty and its only ever partial knowledge -is what makes it compelling.
Many of the points raised here may feel incomplete, partial, and like there are no final, definitive answers, which so happens to be exactly what ethnography should feel like: raising uncertainties in our certitudes. My stomach still churns every time I return to Cuba.
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